Global Warring and Permanent Dry: How heat threatens human security in a warmer world by Marlow, Jennifer & Barcelos, Jennifer Krencicki
Seattle Journal of Environmental Law 
Volume 1 Issue 1 Article 2 
5-31-2011 
Global Warring and Permanent Dry: How heat threatens human 
security in a warmer world 
Jennifer Marlow 
Jennifer Krencicki Barcelos 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjel 
Recommended Citation 
Marlow, Jennifer and Barcelos, Jennifer Krencicki (2011) "Global Warring and Permanent Dry: How heat 
threatens human security in a warmer world," Seattle Journal of Environmental Law: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 
2. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjel/vol1/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal of Environmental 





Global Warring1 and the Permanent Dry2: How heat 
threatens human security in a warmer world 
Jennifer Marlow & Jennifer Krencicki Barcelos† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Our Heat Hypothesis 
 Heat is a more ubiquitous indicator of the problems facing hu-
manity in a warmer world than rising sea levels and the impending cli-
mate refugee crisis. Adaptation policies that respond to the threats from 
heat should promote human security as the best means for addressing 
climate vulnerabilities that threaten human rights and global stability. 
 The climate refugee crisis has captured global attention for good 
reason. The citizens of island nations such as the Maldives, Tuvalu, and 
Kiribati are deemed to become some of the world’s first climate refugees 
as their lands—in some places just 1.5 meters above sea level—slowly 
become engulfed by rising seas. Facing existential threat, the fate of 
small-island states is apparently and despicably debatable as the world’s 
most wealthy economies refuse to commit to legally binding greenhouse 
gas emissions reductions. Leaders of small-island nations have worked 
tirelessly to shift the climate policy debate away from technical market 
fixes toward the human impacts of climate change as rising seas threaten 
their very survival. 
                                                 
 1. Phrase coined by Cleo Paskal, Associate Fellow at Chatham House (the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs). CLEO PASKAL, GLOBAL WARRING: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL, ECONOMIC, 
AND POLITICAL CRISES WILL REDRAW THE WORLD MAP (Palgrave Macmillan 2010). 
 2. Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 
PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 1704, (Feb. 10, 2009). See also Joe Romm, Climate 
Progress Blog, Sept. 6, 2007, http://climateprogress.org/2007/09/06/australia-faces-the-permanent-
dry-as-do-we/. 
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gi, Louis Wolcher, Michele Storms, David Battisti, Gus Speth, Mickey Glantz, Stephen Gardiner, 
Alex Steffen, Michael Robinson-Dorn, and Peter Sauer. The authors accept full responsibility for the 
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 Thus, small island states have come to symbolize climate justice 
for the media, lawmakers, and activists. However, the narrow focus by 
media, law and policy makers, and organizations such as our own on isl-
and nations as the only illustration of climate justice is dangerously sim-
plistic. Like the tragic image of a polar bear precariously balancing on 
the only tiny iceberg in sight, the heavy focus on sea level rise obscures 
other physical and societal changes that provide a more complete under-
standing of climate impacts. The popular focus on climate refugees ig-
nores 1) the pervasive role of heat as well as non-climate threats in creat-
ing rising instability and global migration over time, 2) the links between 
those who leave and those who stay, and 3) global hot spots for climate 
justice—places where complex layers of human, social, and political 
conflict complicate the causality of climate change in threatening human 
security and well-being.3 (See fig. 1). 
 
Figure 1. Global hot spots, shaded, should receive greater attention 
due to the potential security risks triggered by overlapping climate 
impacts.4 
                                                 
 3. RENATE SCHUBERT ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AS A SECURITY RISK, GERMAN ADVISORY 
COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE, May 2007, at 4, http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_jg2007_engl.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
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 This essay will attempt to correct the oversimplification of cli-
mate justice as a crisis culminating in waves of climate refugees. Instead, 
we focus on how heat increases vulnerability of cultures, institutions, 
lifestyles, occupations, human rights, and community viability due to 
both rising global average temperatures and the resulting destabilizing 
societal consequences of inequity in a warmer world. It will illuminate 
the ways in which heat is the biggest climate-driven threat to global hu-
man security, particularly in non-island regions and states where social 
stability and improved development hold tremendous geopolitical impor-
tance. The essay will then discuss ways in which current legal and politi-
cal responses are inadequately prepared to handle heat vulnerability. We 
propose that human security should become a central factor in new insti-
tutions being conceived around climate-induced social and political is-
sues, ranging from crop failure to, in a worst-case scenario, voluntary or 
forced climate-induced displacement. 
B. Why a Focus on Heat Is Useful for Framing Human Needs in a   
Warmer World 
For now, these hot days, is the mad blood stirring.5 
—William Shakespeare 
 Approaches to climate adaptation too often neglect slow-onset 
climatic changes such as heat stress,6 while more dramatic events such as 
disappearing islands and floods of migrating “climate change refugees”7 
receive exaggerated levels of attention. This misplaced attention is sig-
nificant for several reasons. First, there is very little empirical evidence 
suggesting that climate change has caused migration.8 Second, more 
                                                 
 5. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 3, sc. 1 (Wordsworth Editions Ltd 
1996) (1596). 
 6. Graeme Hugo, Climate Change-Induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia 
and the Pacific at 11, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES 9, 11 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010). 
 7. There is no universally agreed upon definition of a “climate refugee.” The definition we use 
is that a “climate change refugee” is “an individual who is forced to flee his or her home and to 
relocate temporarily or permanently across a national boundary as the result of sudden or gradual 
environmental disruption that is consistent with climate change and to which humans more likely 
than not contributed.” See Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Propos-
al for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 361 (2009). The 
1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone with a “well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.” See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150, art. 1(A)(2). 
 8. Stephen Castles, Afterword: What now? Climate-Induced Displacement after Copenhagen, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 239, 244 (Jane 
McAdam ed., 2010). 
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people will be affected by heat than forced migration from Pacific island 
nations. For example, sixty-eight percent of people living in the Pacific 
islands live in Papua New Guinea, but most of Papua New Guinea’s 
population lives inland.9 Thus, impacts such as temperature changes and 
shifts in precipitation patterns will be more important for adaptation than 
sea level rise alone.10 
Despite the very real impacts of climate change on peoples forced to mi-
grate, heat is a chronic, undervalued threat to human communities eve-
rywhere. A recent study concluded that over the next twenty to fifty 
years, warmer temperatures will cause drier conditions and persistent 
droughts in many highly populated regions around the world.11 Dr. Ai-
guo Dai, who conducted the study, spoke of the significance of the re-
sults: “If the projections in this study come even close to being realized, 
the consequences for society worldwide will be enormous.”12 What are 
these consequences for society? NASA scientist James Hansen has 
warned that international efforts to cap warming to under two degrees 
Celsius may not be ambitious enough to avoid dangerous tipping 
points.13 James Lovelock, well-known for his Gaia hypothesis,14 warns 
of the near-extinction of the human species. Lovelock paints a vivid pic-
ture of Hansen’s danger scenario: 
[I]n the hot arid world survivors gather for the journey to the new 
Arctic centers of civilization; I see them in the desert as the dawn 
breaks and the sun throws its piercing gaze across the horizon at the 
camp. The cool fresh night air lingers for a while and then, like 
smoke, dissipates as the heat takes charge. Their camel wakes, 
blinks and slowly rises on her haunches. The few remaining mem-
                                                 
 9. It must also be noted, however, that plans exist to voluntarily resettle most of the Carteret 
Islands’ population of 3,300. See Ursula Rakova, How-to Guide for Environmental Refugees, Our 
World 2.0 United Nations University Blog (June 16, 2009), http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/how-to-
guide-for-environmental-refugees/. 
 10. Castles, supra note 8, at 244 (citing Richard Bedford, Director of the Population Studies 
Centre of the University of Waikato, New Zealand). 
 11. Aiguo Dai, Drought Under Global Warming: A Review, WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY 
REVIEWS: CLIMATE CHANGE (advanced review), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wcc.81/pdf. 
 12. Peter Applebome, Ignoring the Planet Won’t Fix It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010 (quoting 
Aiguo Dai), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/28/nyregion/28towns.html. 
 13. See James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO(2): Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 
OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 217-18, 226 (2008). 
 14. The Gaia Hypothesis imagines the planet as a self-regulating life-system. See JAMES 
LOVELOCK, GAIA: A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTH (Oxford University Press 2000). 
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bers of the tribe mount. She belches, and sets off on the long un-
bearably hot journey to the next oasis.15 
 In our work, we often say that climate change creates winners 
and losers. For example, high altitude climates are predicted to be cli-
mate “winners” for many reasons, a major one being that agricultural 
productivity is expected to increase in northern climates.16 However, a 
“winners versus losers” mentality is overly simplistic. Arctic communi-
ties such as the native village of Kivalina, Alaska, are tasked with finding 
their own funds to permanently relocate because of melting permafrost 
and eroding coastal shorelines due to anthropogenic climate change.17 
Lovelock’s unforgiving portrayal of the “winner”—a barren refugee 
camp in the Arctic desert—is important because it does not overlook the 
complexities of climate change issues. Admittedly, it is also quite bleak. 
 Lovelock’s end myth for human civilization may seem sensatio-
nalized and a figment of pure science fiction. But for those who doubt its 
possibility, it is worth noting that current levels of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide concentrations almost identically mimic the atmospheric concen-
trations during the Pliocene period, an era three million years ago when 
the North Pole was ice-free and temperatures in the Arctic were nearly 
three degrees Celsius warmer.18 Three degrees Celsius is the approximate 
global average temperature rise predicted for the year 2100 by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)19—the most rigorously 
peer-reviewed scientific body in history.20 Although the Pliocene may 
not be a perfect analogue for the future, at least it is a window through 
which we can view a possibility. 
 Lovelock’s vision of the future certainly lacks the optimism and 
political salience required to cater to an American electorate stacked with 
shortsighted leaders and misguided patriots. But it teaches us that a 
                                                 
 15. JAMES GARVEY, THE ETHICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: RIGHT AND WRONG IN A 
WARMING WORLD 30 (Continuum International Publishing Group 2008) (quoting JAMES 
LOVELOCK, THE REVENGE OF GAIA (Penguin Books 2006)). 
 16. WILLIAM R. CLINE, GLOBAL WARMING AND AGRICULTURE: IMPACT ESTIMATES BY 
COUNTRY (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2007). 
 17. See Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 
2009). 
 18. MARK LYNAS, SIX DEGREES: OUR FUTURE ON A HOTTER PLANET National Geographic 
Society 133 (2008) (citing A. Haywood & P. Valdes, Modeling Pliocene Warmth: Contribution of 
Atmosphere, Oceans and Cryosphere, EARTH AND PLANETARY SCIENCE LETTERS 218, 363–77 
(2004)). 
 19. R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II AND III TO 
THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
IPCC, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
 20. Stacy Feldman, Climate Scientists Defend IPCC Peer Review as Most Rigorous in History, 
Solve Climate Blog, Feb. 26, 2010, http://solveclimatenews.com/news/20100226/climate-scientists-
defend-ipcc-peer-review-most-rigorous-history. 
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“winners versus losers” take on humanity’s future is an overly simplistic 
way of thinking about the impacts of climate change. A camel stalked by 
Arctic heat complicates the notion of what it is like to “win” in a warmer 
world. It is Lovelock’s questioning of what it means to win at this “glob-
al warring” wherein the value of his vision lies. A warmer world is likely 
to an incredibly inhospitable place for much of humanity, and so we 
must find a way to think and talk about climate change that acknowledg-
es the depth of the problem and its implications for human civilization. 
To further illustrate Lovelock’s vision, we will now take a closer look at 
the implications and insecurities of a warmer world. 
II. EXAMINING HEAT THROUGH A CLIMATE JUSTICE FRAMEWORK 
 To help us examine the human impacts of climate change, we 
have developed a five-part framework for climate justice comprised of 1) 
health, 2) food and water, 3) security, 4) equity, and 5) justice. We think 
it is important that this framework not only hold up as a distinct set of 
categories, but also in the aggregate. Although each section of the 
framework can stand alone as its own category of impacts, many of the 
themes of climate justice overlap and are cross cutting. As a potential 
model for future institutions or agreements addressing climate justice, 
our framework aims to integrate solutions across disciplines and bridge 
traditionally separate issue areas. Heat impacts are just one set of climate 
issues that could be viewed through the lens of this framework. As dis-
cussed above, it is likely that the impacts of heat will be particularly de-
vastating and pervasive. 
1. Health 
 First, the warmer world is likely to be an unhealthy world. Ac-
cording to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, extreme heat events kill 
more people annually than hurricanes, lightning, tornados, floods, earth-
quakes, and all other natural disasters combined.21 And that is before fi-
guring in a hotter climate. The IPCC reports that, “Cities that currently 
experience heat waves are expected to be further challenged by an in-
creased number, intensity and duration of heat waves during the course 
of the century.”22 Elderly, low income, and socially isolated individuals 
are amongst the most vulnerable to heat waves, particularly if they live in 
cities, where the urban heat island effect can add between two and twen-
                                                 
 21. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Extreme Heat, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/ 
disasters/extremeheat/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 22. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 
(2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm. 
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ty-two degrees Fahrenheit to soaring temperatures.23 This can be espe-
cially dangerous in places like northern Europe where people are more 
prepared to deal with extreme cold than extreme heat. It is estimated that 
over 50,000 people died (2000 per day in August) during the European 
Heat Wave of 2003, from temperatures just 3.6 degrees Celsius above 
normal.24 
2. Food and Water 
 Coupled with heat-related dangers to public health, the warmer 
world is likely to be a hungry world. Heat can be devastating to crops, 
and in many places, climate change is already reducing agricultural 
productivity. A recent newspaper headline, ripped from the front page of 
the San Francisco Chronicle’s business section, reads “World’s Wheat 
Crop Stressed.”25 According to the article, “Yields aren’t keeping up 
with a world growing hungrier. Crops are stunted in a world grown war-
mer. A devastating fungus, a wheat ‘rust,’ is spreading out of Africa, a 
grave threat to the food plant that covers more of the planet’s surface 
than any other.”26 The article continues, “In the face of leapfrogging 
prices, stagnating yields and shifting climate zones, wheat cannot be 
counted on to fill humankind’s stomach in the future as it has since at 
least 7000 BC.”27 The article is right to call attention to the multitude of 
social and scientific factors that combine to create food insecurity. 
 One such factor that will compound all of this for much of Africa 
will be desertification. It is estimated that by 2050, there could be less 
than ninety reliable crop-growing days per year in parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa.28 (See Fig. 2). 
 
 
                                                 
 23. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REDUCING URBAN HEAT ISLANDS: 
COMPENDIUM OF STRATEGIES (October 2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/heatisld/resources/compendium.htm. 
 24. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSES TO 
EXTREME WEATHER: A TECHNICAL REPORT BY THE WHO EUROPE (2009), 
http://ccsl.iccip.net/e92474.pdf. See also Earth Policy Institute, Plan B Updates (2006), available at 
http://www.earth-policy.org/index.php?/plan_b_updates/2006/update56. 
 25. Charles J. Hanley, World’s Wheat Crop Stressed, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2010, at D1. See 
also Andrew E. Kramer, Russia, Crippled by Drought, Bans Grain Exports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/world/europe/06russia.html. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. P.G. Jones & P.K. Thornton, Croppers to Livestock Keepers: Livelihood Transitions to 
2050 in Africa Due to Climate Change, 12 ENVTL. SCI. POL’Y 427, 448 (2009), available at 
http://www.gecafs.org/documents/PP11Jones.pdf. 
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Figure 2. This figure displays how climate change is predicted to 
impact the world’s food supply by 2080. 29 
 The warmer world will lead to reduced yields of many staple 
grains: wheat, maize, rice, and soybeans. A rule of thumb is that for 
every one degree Celsius increase in temperature, cereal grain crop 
yields will decline by about 10 percent.30 Importantly, this decline is at-
tributable to temperature increases only; scientists did not factor in any 
changes in precipitation, pathogen responses, or other possible impacts 
on food production in their study. In hotter weather and with longer 
growing seasons, plants may mature faster, but overall yield is reduced.31 
In addition, current research reveals that the rising temperatures asso-
ciated with climate change could significantly reduce the protein content 
of many of the major grains that people depend on for survival.32 As Fig-
ure 2 indicates, some regions may benefit from climate change’s hotter 
temperatures, but much of the Global South will see reduced yields of 
crops that are already in scarce supply. And, according to the map, Rus-
sia’s crops were supposed to benefit from warmer weather. 
 The warmer world will also be a thirstier world. And there are 
already a lot of thirsty people. Take water scarcity, in India, for example, 
                                                 
 29. CLINE, supra note 16. 
 30. David Battisti and Rosamond Naylor, Historical Warnings of Future Food Insecurity with 
Unprecedented Seasonal Heat, 323 SCIENCE 240, Jan. 9, 2009. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Daniel R. Taub, Brian Miller & Holly Allen, Effects of Elevated CO2 on the Protein Con-
centration of Food Crops: a Meta-analysis, 14 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 565 (Mar. 2008), availa-
ble at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1365-2486.2007.01511.x/full. 
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where the magnitude of drying far exceeds the capacity of afterthought 
or charity to provide an adequate response as people kill each other with 
swords in the slums of Bhopal over access to limited freshwater. India’s 
2009 record drought and shifting monsoon caused “the driest June for 83 
years . . . exacerbating the effects of a widespread drought and setting 
neighbour against neighbour in a desperate fight for survival.”33 One 
hundred thousand people in Bhopal already rely entirely on the daily de-
livery of water from water tankers to meet their survival needs.34 
 The UN has warned for many years that water shortages will 
become one of the most pressing problems on the planet over the coming 
decades, with one report estimating that four billion people will be af-
fected by 2050. What is happening in India, which has too many people 
in places where there is not enough water, is a foretaste of what is to 
come.35 
 Will we be delivering water to four billion people via tanker 
trucks in India? How about in the United States? The recent drought 
study by Dr. Dai mentioned earlier poses equal challenges for the United 
States, particularly for the Southwest.36 Although the United States has 
avoided significant drying over the past fifty years due to natural climate 
variations, much of the United States will experience severe drying with-
in the next few decades.37 Imminent drying could cause water levels in 
the Colorado River and Lake Mead to drop, further endangering the wa-
ter supply for the Southwest.38 Dr. Dai also predicts droughts of devastat-
ing severity by 2030 in southern Europe, Southeast Asia, Brazil, Chile, 
Australia, and a majority of Africa.39 
3. Security 
 The warmer world is likely to be a less secure world. Looking 
beyond the public health impacts of heat waves and the phenomenon of 
reduced agricultural productivity and water scarcity, the warmer world is 
going to be a more violent place. In fact, there is a phrase in psychology, 
“the heat hypothesis,” which is used to describe this very phenomenon.40 
                                                 
 33. Gethin Chamberlain, India Prays for Rain as Water Wars Break Out, THE OBSERVER, July 
12, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/12/india-water-supply-bhopal. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Dai, supra note 11. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Mike Orcutt, A Cut-and-Dry Forecast: U.S. Southwest’s Dry Spell May Become Long-
Lasting and Intensify as Climate Change Takes Hold, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Oct. 29, 2010, availa-
ble at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=forecast-us-southwest-drought. 
 39. See Dai, supra note 11. 
 40. Craig A. Anderson, Heat and Violence, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SCIENCE 33 (2001). 
28 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 1:19 
Studies of this relationship between human behavior and weather pat-
terns date back to the time of Cicero (106–32 BC), although the topic 
was first empirically studied in the 1700s.41 Research by criminal psy-
chologist Ehor Boyanowsky, a professor at Simon Fraser University, 
shows that “elevated ambient temperatures lead to increased brain tem-
peratures that result in cognitive dysfunction, emotional stress, and ag-
gression,” as well as increases in violent crime.42 
 According to another study by Iowa State psychologist Craig 
Anderson and sociologist Matthew DeLisi, “higher temperatures can in-
crease aggression in myriad ways.”43 Based on their analysis of violent 
crime data for the period between 1950 and 2008, the researchers esti-
mate that an increase of 4.4 degrees Celsius in the United States would 
result in more than 100,000 additional violent crimes nationwide per 
year.44 But, the researchers caution, regular heat-fueled aggression is on-
ly one part of the problem. Migration, when it does take place, is likely 
to lead to even more violent behavior that can take on various forms of 
civil unrest. As DeLisi notes, “displacement and migration of people 
across borders can potentially lead to a lot more human conflict.”45 He 
points out the example of a post-Hurricane Katrina spike in Houston ho-
micides, which has been linked to spars between Houston gangs and 
those gangs displaced from New Orleans.46 The Katrina example may 
seem unique, but there is actually potential for increased violence across 
the world as shown in Figure 1. The map showcases how climate-
induced environmental stresses will overlay one another and create or 
exacerbate political instability resulting in “climate change hot spots.” 
The areas that face water insecurity also face food insecurity and these 
factors combine and can lead to the forced migration of climate refugees. 
 Without adequate access to food and water, and with more vi-
olence and aggression, it is not hard to see how many people in the war-
mer world could be less secure. How will we cope with a climate-
dominated future? What kinds of needs will we voice? As the 1994 Unit-
ed Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development 
Report (HDR) describes: 
                                                 
 41. Id. 
 42. Ker Than, Global Warming Making People More Aggressive?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, 
Mar. 24, 2010, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/03/100324-global-warming-violence-
aggression/. 
 43. Id. See also C.A. Anderson & M. DeLisi, Implications of Global Climate Change for Vi-
olence in Developed and Developing Countries, in SOCIAL CONFLICT AND AGGRESSION (J. Forgas, 
A. Kruglanski & K. Williams eds., forthcoming). 
 44. Than, supra note 42. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries 
about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. 
Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their 
jobs? Will their streets and neighborhoods be safe from crime? Will 
they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they become a victim of 
violence because of their gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin 
target them for persecution?47 
 Through its 1994 HDR, the UNDP promoted a new concept of 
security in the post-Cold War era, human security, as a more holistic al-
ternative to the traditional twentieth century reliance on heavy militariza-
tion and notions of security centered on nation-states.48 Security in a 
warmer world must take on new meanings, and many traditional security 
institutions are now beginning to reexamine what this new security para-
digm could look like. 
 Every year, Foreign Policy magazine collaborates with The 
Fund for Peace to create an index that evaluates the security of the 
world’s countries. In the summer of 2009, the index featured a special 
article devoted to the destabilizing effects of climate change. The article 
concludes, “[a]s global warming churns the world’s weather, it’s becom-
ing increasingly clear that it’s time to start thinking about the long term. 
In doing so, the West may need to adopt an even broader definition of 
what it takes to protect itself from danger.”49 Challenging the common 
discourse about global security threats related to Pakistan, the article 
suggests that “[w]hen it comes to the stability of one of the world’s most 
volatile regions, it’s the fate of the Himalayan glaciers that should be 
keeping us awake at night.”50 Perhaps, the article suggests, climate 
change is on par with terrorism as a threat to the United States and the 
global world order. According to a recent New York Times article, a new 
type of national intelligence work is being founded on the assumption 
“that the 21st century will be shaped not just by competitive economic 
growth, but also by potentially disruptive scarcities—depletion of miner-
als; desertification of land; pollution or overuse of water; weather 
changes that kill fish and farms.”51 
                                                 
 47. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: NEW DIMENSIONS 
OF HUMAN SECURITY 1994, at 22 (1994), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/chapters/ [hereinafter 1994 HDR]. 
 48. See generally SHANNON BEEBE & MARY KALDOR, THE ULTIMATE WEAPON IS NO 
WEAPON (PublicAffairs 2010). 
 49. Stephan Faris, The Last Straw, FOREIGN POL’Y, June 22, 2009. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Thom Shanker, Why We Might Fight, 2011 Edition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/12/weekinreview/12shanker.html?hp. 
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4. Equity 
 The warmer world is likely to be a more unequal world. The ef-
fects of climate impacts to health, food and water, and security will not 
be felt equally across the human race. One way that inequality could ma-
nifest is in the further marginalization of women. According to Heather 
Goldsworthy Davila, a research associate at the University of California, 
Irvine, Center for Unconventional Security Affairs, “gender, race, and 
class are very powerful intervening variables when considering human 
security,” and “in situations of instability and insecurity, women are 
comparatively less well-off compared to men in their communities owing 
to their disadvantageous social status and the restrictions of their gender 
roles.”52 Indeed, studies of the 2003 European heat wave suggest that the 
excess mortality rate was 75 percent higher for women than for men.53 
And inequality between men and women is only one type of inequality 
that we will likely see in a warmer world. North versus south, rich versus 
poor, and born versus future generations will also be implicated. In fact, 
University of Chicago geophysical scientist David Archer’s research 
shows that it will take several centuries for the planet’s oceans to absorb 
roughly three quarters of anthropogenic carbon dioxide.54 The remaining 
carbon will stay in the atmosphere for thousands of years, with ten per-
cent remaining in the atmosphere for 100,000 years.55 The people of the 
future will carry a huge burden as the world warms from destabilizing 
amounts of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. 
5. Justice 
 A warmer world will likely be a less just world. Human rights 
law will be marginalized in an era of global climate change. A case de-
cided by South Africa’s Constitutional Court on October 8, 2009 is illu-
strative. Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others was 
the first test case on South Africa’s constitutional right to water.56 The 
plaintiffs in the case were five impoverished residents of Phiri in Soweto, 
one of the poorest black townships that developed in Johannesburg dur-
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ing apartheid.57 By shutting off their water supply, the plaintiffs con-
tended that the city’s water company was denying them one of their basic 
human rights.58 Although lower courts found the plaintiff’s arguments 
compelling, and thereby validated that economic and social rights should 
have a minimum core content, South Africa’s high court rejected the 
minimum core content argument and instead adopted the commonly used 
standard for human rights—reasonableness in light of the theory of pro-
gressive realization.59 This case illustrates an important concern about 
the feasibility of using human rights law to address climate harms. While 
principles of human rights have seen wide expansion since the Second 
World War, perhaps best illustrated by the United Nation’s adoption of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, climate change is 
likely to create a prolonged period of retraction as the conditions for the 
realization of these rights regress. Without a strong emphasis on building 
capacity for rule of law protections, as well as the realization of econom-
ic and social rights for billions of people, the concept of an ever-
expanding ideal of democratic justice is likely to be just a fantasy. 
 The vivid picture of a warmer world is a world that is more dan-
gerous, more violent, hungrier and thirstier, less secure, more unequal, 
and less just. The law must adapt. Our climate justice framework offers a 
useful starting place. 
III. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INSECURITY 
 The above sampling of the human impacts of a warmer world is 
merely the tip of a much larger iceberg. As influential as climate impacts 
are alone, it is the global response to these impacts that will inevitably 
shape our collective future. The story, in the end, will be less about heat, 
rising seas, or droughts. What we do—or do not do—as a global com-
munity to prepare for the impacts from climate change will ultimately 
shape the course of human history. We, particularly those of us who live 
in wealthy countries such as the United States, can choose adaptation 
policies that either secure global stability or plunge it further into 
chaos.60 
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 Consider, for example, the political inaction on climate change 
in the United States. Despite Dr. Dai’s “portrait of worsening drought,”61 
his report “didn’t register on any political radar screens, amid Kentucky 
foot stomps, dead wrestlers, $2 billion in campaign spending and the 
pitched battles for control of Congress.”62 By ignoring reports of severely 
devastating temperatures and drought predictions, decision makers ig-
nore the vivid picture painted across the full spectrum of our climate jus-
tice framework. The United States cannot afford to be optimistic about 
its future without redirecting its public policies and international priori-
ties toward a more secure world, and this includes embracing adaptation 
policies that prioritize human security. Until the United States takes cli-
mate change seriously, it cannot claim to take its security seriously. 
 Two related issues frame U.S. political debates on climate 
change. First, both sides of the U.S. political spectrum struggle to grasp 
the full scope of the climate justice problem. The political Right simply 
denies the existence of anthropogenic climate change, while the political 
Left adopts a “green jobs” and “clean tech” frame for promoting climate 
policy. The green jobs rhetoric aims to revitalize an economy emerging 
out of recession while also addressing the climate crisis. Second, the de-
dication to capitalism at any cost is causing political leaders to lose sight 
of the importance of addressing climate change for global security. Al-
though investments in clean tech and green jobs are critical in achieving 
U.S. energy independence, the scope of the climate crisis requires sensi-
ble solutions that emerge outside the current growth-centric economic 
paradigm—the very worldview that is responsible for much of the prob-
lem. James Gustave Speth, a pioneer in environmental law, blames 
growth-driven capitalism for much of the world’s degradation, including 
the climate crisis: 
An unquestioning society-wide commitment to economic growth at 
any cost; powerful corporate interests whose overriding objective is 
to grow by generating profit; markets that systematically fail to  
recognize environmental costs unless corrected by government; 
government that is subservient to corporate interests and the growth 
imperative; rampant consumerism spurred by sophisticated advertis-
ing and marketing; economic activity now so large in scale that its 
impacts alter the fundamental biophysical operations of the planet—
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all combine to deliver an ever-growing world economy that is un-
dermining the ability of the planet to sustain life.63 
 Speth’s scathing critique of the market’s impact on the environ-
ment illustrates the difficulty of addressing an issue like climate change 
within the current economic and institutional confines. Our collective 
decisions seem to presuppose a nonsensical distinction between the envi-
ronment and the economy,64 and few seem to openly question that the 
market is the appropriate tool for addressing the climate crisis.65 
 The news media has done far too little to draw attention to this 
contradiction or the fact the climate change is far more than an environ-
mental concern. Journalist Eric Pooley, recipient of the 1996 Gerald Ford 
Prize for Excellence in Reporting while serving as Time’s White House 
correspondent, analyzed media coverage of climate change for fifteen 
months and wrote a report titled, “How Much Would You Pay to Save 
the Planet? The American Press and the Economics of Climate 
Change.”66 Concluding that the press has badly misrepresented climate 
change by pigeonholing it as an environmental issue, Pooley wrote: 
In general, global warming is still being shoved into the “environ-
ment” pigeonhole, along with the spotted owls and delta smelt, 
when it is clearly to society’s detriment to think about the subject 
that way. It is time for editors to treat climate policy as a permanent, 
important beat: tracking a mobilization for the moral equivalent of 
war.67 
 While journalists must play a bigger role in “tracking a mobiliza-
tion for the moral equivalent of war,” governments must actually mobil-
ize on adaptation in order to confront a reality that looks “strangely like 
war.”68 Admittedly, this is a much bigger, harder to imagine, and more 
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expensive task than mitigating emissions. Yet within the growth-at-all-
costs economic agenda—one that continues to incentivize a carbon-based 
economy while ignoring the human and security costs of such an ap-
proach—grim visions of a warmer world such as those painted by Love-
lock, Hansen, and others remain marginalized. 
 The act of imagining a warmer world provides a legitimate op-
portunity to critically question whether the current political and econom-
ic orders actually serve us in building a better—and more secure—future 
for ourselves and for our children. 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF ADAPTATION: CLIMATE CHANGE WILL 
AMPLIFY UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INSECURITY 
 Adaptation is the process of building resilience to climate im-
pacts. It is becoming an ever more important task as major emitters such 
as the United States and China fail to adopt binding emissions reduction 
targets.69 Shortly after taking office, the Obama Administration created 
an Interagency Climate Change Task Force tasked with supplying the 
administration with recommended actions in support of a national cli-
mate change adaptation strategy.70 The recommendations offer specific 
near-term adaptation goals as well as recommendations for approaches to 
developing a national strategy.71 Key policy goals include mainstreaming 
adaptation planning across the federal government, better integrating 
science into decision making, addressing key cross-cutting issues such as 
water and health, supporting international adaptation efforts, and build-
ing the capacity of the federal government to partner with and support 
adaptation at local, state, and tribal levels.72 Although this task force is a 
good start, progress on adaptation is only in its initial planning phase. 
Despite Congress’s failure to pass comprehensive climate legislation, 
mitigation policies to curb carbon pollution are still much more advanced 
than adaptation policies. Yet developing countries—”particularly those 
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experiencing what they believe to be climate impacts now—are especial-
ly adamant that adaptation must secure equal status to mitigation.”73 
 The 2007 IPCC report defines adaptation as “[t]he adjustment in 
natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic sti-
muli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial oppor-
tunities.”74 In other words, adaptation is about “managing the unavoida-
ble.”75 Often overshadowed by mitigation efforts to slow greenhouse gas 
emissions, adaptation gets weaker political support, fewer sound bites, 
and less attention from scholars and policymakers. To some, adaptation 
unpopularly suggests concession to a warmer world. Another reason 
adaptation is unpopular is because it requires unprecedented levels of 
cooperation and engagement. Unlike mitigation policy, the proposals for 
which are largely market-driven, adaptation policy necessitates a big role 
for governments. This is because without improved political and legal 
institutions to reduce poverty and inequity, environmental challenges 
such as climate change will continue to be a prominent factor in under-
mining economic and political stability. Governments, international co-
operation, and the domestic rule of law must play a key role in ensuring 
future security and stability as we adapt to life in a warmer world. 
 The world needs real, not rhetorical, adaptation policies. Even if 
every person on the planet stopped emitting the greenhouse gases from 
fossil fuels today, elevated levels of carbon dioxide will linger in the at-
mosphere for thousands of years.76 NOAA scientists have concluded that 
climate change is “largely irreversible for 1000 years”77 and predicts dire 
impacts for the overall climate system as a result, such as a one thousand 
year Dust Bowl in the American Southwest, which is predicted to be ir-
reversibly dry desert by 2050.78 In a Nature article last year titled “Over-
shoot, adapt, and recover,” IPCC scientists concede that because we will 
likely overshoot carbon emissions targets, adaptation policy deserves 
even more robust attention.79 John Holdren, President Obama’s science 
advisor, explained that “[w]e basically have three choices: mitigation, 
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adaptation[,] and suffering. We’re going to do some of each. The ques-
tion is what the mix is going to be. The more mitigation we do, the less 
adaptation will be required and the less suffering there will be.”80 
 Unequivocally, the world is getting warmer. Significant suffer-
ing could be alleviated by spending money on adaptation that provides 
better access to basic human services. Funding for public health, water 
delivery methods, and food storage facilities will reduce the degree to 
which people suffer while the United States and other countries ideally 
formulate a robust set of adaptation policies. However, given that 1) we 
have collectively evaded mitigation—the cheaper option of climate 
change prevention,81 2) neglected adaptation, and 3) chosen suffering by 
default, disaster relief and humanitarian aid are likely fallbacks. Yet hu-
manitarian aid and voluntary charitable giving campaigns are an inade-
quate substitute for a comprehensive adaptation response. 
 Humanitarian response cannot stand in for climate adaptation 
policy because climate changes are becoming irreversible.82 In a warmer 
world, drought endures; and in a state of permanent dry, drought will 
come again. Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Huma-
nitarian Affairs Jan Egeland critiques humanitarian efforts for saving 
people’s lives today so that they can die tomorrow.83 Talking about Dar-
fur at a 2008 Carnegie Council event, Egeland said: 
Number one, it’s not enough with blankets and it’s not enough to 
keep people alive if there is no security and, now, durable political 
solutions. The story of Darfur, as I see it, is that we treated it as if it 
was a natural disaster, whereas it was manmade, from A to Z, as a 
war. It is exacerbated by climate change, but it was manmade, as a 
disaster.84 
 Views of climate change as a series of natural disasters shape 
incomplete policy responses. Egeland’s moral approach to climate 
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change reveals how critically important a rights-based, long-term ap-
proach is to any human security agenda that informs climate adaptation. 
The U.S. military is critical to this approach because climate change 
makes bad things worse. It threatens human well-being for a multitude of 
issues and on a variety of scales. Some refer to climate change as a 
“threat multiplier,” with the propensity to create global instability and 
even failed states.85 In a 2007 report, the Center for Naval Analysis 
found that: “Unlike most conventional security threats that involve a sin-
gle entity acting in specific ways and points in time, climate change has 
the potential to result in multiple chronic conditions, occurring globally 
within the same time frame.”86 In responding to these complex threats, 
the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 
acknowledges that “climate change will shape the operating environ-
ment, roles, and missions” of the department.87 
 Lieutenant Colonel Shannon D. Beebe, the Senior Africa Analyst 
in the Office of United States Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelli-
gence, has come up with a novel way of describing this new type of se-
curity. Beebe speaks about the importance of moving from a “kinetics-
based” security, one that mobilizes planes and tanks, to a “conditions-
based security,” where the military becomes an active agent of social 
change by addressing creeping vulnerabilities.88 Beebe calls for a shift 
from an algebraic to a calculus-based model of security, which would 
require military intelligence to adapt and respond better to multiple com-
binations of different permutations of future conditions.89 Think about 
this as a shift from Normandy to 9/11. Omaha Beach required a sophisti-
cated coordination of allied support to help U.S. Army Rangers enter 
France by sea, set against the bunker-driven munitions fire from occupy-
ing German infantry. While the battle was extremely difficult, there was 
a clear enemy and a clear strategy. The U.S. War on Terror, on the other 
hand, requires a very different set of strategies. Enemies, primarily loose 
affiliations of individuals with varying agendas, are often elusive. For 
example, a Chicago-bound printer toner cartridge, packed with explo-
sives and shipped by an unknown woman in Yemen via UPS, becomes a 
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national security threat.90 Commercial airplanes have become weapons of 
mass destruction. 
 Beebe’s message is that both silver bullet solutions and the Cold 
War “winners versus losers” mentality have become obsolete in a war-
mer world. Indeed, Beebe is no lone renegade in the armed forces. On 
October 13, 2010, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, made the following remarks at an Energy Security Forum in Wash-
ington, D.C.: 
As glaciers melt and shrink at a faster rate, water supplies have been 
diminishing in parts of Asia. Rising sea levels could lead to a mass 
migration and displacement similar to what we have seen in Pakis-
tan’s flood. And climate shifts could drastically reduce the arable 
land needed to feed a burgeoning population as we have seen in 
parts of Africa. The scarcity of and potential competition for re-
sources like water, food and space, compounded by an influx of ref-
ugees if coastal lands are lost, does not only create a humanitarian 
crisis but creates conditions of hopelessness that could lead to failed 
states and make populations vulnerable to radicalization. These 
challenges highlight the systemic implications and multiple-order 
effects inherent in energy security and climate change.91 
 Heat makes glaciers melt. Melting glaciers pose tremendous 
challenges for the leaders within the armed forces to provide the type of 
military intelligence that adaptation researchers and policy makers need 
as they crafts laws and policies that leverage the interconnections be-
tween climate change, development, creeping vulnerabilities, and geopo-
litical stability. Adaptation policies must become an institutionalized part 
of security strategies in a warmer world, and vice versa. We believe that 
“human security” is a powerful conceptual framework for combining 
climate adaptation and global security goals. 
V. REBRANDING CLIMATE ADAPTATION: PRIORITIZING HUMAN 
SECURITY IN A WARMER WORLD 
In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a 
disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension 
that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. 
Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with 
human life and dignity. 
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—United Nations Dev. Programme, Human Development 
Report.92 
 Because of the nature of climate change, typically intensified 
through creeping social and ecological vulnerabilities, we embrace a shift 
in the security narrative that focuses on “human security”93 rather than 
state-based security. According to the UNDP in its 1994 HDR, “[t]he 
concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly . . . It has 
been related more to nation-states than to people . . . Forgotten were the 
legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily 
lives.”94 With these concerns in mind, we have chosen to borrow a defi-
nition of human security from the Global Environmental Change and 
Human Security project: “Human security is achieved when and where 
individuals and communities have the options necessary to end, mitigate, 
or adapt to threats to their human, environmental and social rights, have 
the capacity and freedom to exercise those options, and actively partici-
pate in attaining those options.”95 Thus, human security assumes a basic 
measure of political stability and encompasses a variety of basic human 
rights and entitlements, including substantive and procedural rights. 
 According to development scholar Des Gasper, “The concept of 
human security redirects attention in discussions of security, beyond the 
nation-state level, beyond physical violence as the only relevant 
threat/vector, and beyond physical harm as the only relevant damage.”96 
Gasper challenges us to think beyond violence: 
The causes and knock-on effects of damage through violence are so 
ramifying that while violence appears convenient as a focus for data 
collection and subsequent model-building, the associated research 
and policy are forced to ramify. A narrow frame provides no self-
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enclosed analytical coherence. We cannot afford to ignore wider 
causes and effects, and to treat the latter as externalities that will be 
absorbed by the human and natural environments. The world con-
tains too much interconnection, fragility, and risk of straying past 
tipping points.97 
 It is vital, then, that we study and understand these tipping 
points—climatic, political, and cultural alike. Although the climate refu-
gee crisis may be one dominant tipping point, akin to Gasper’s notion of 
a “convenient” problem,98 there are many others to choose from in the 
climate context. The 1994 HDR outlined one set of human security indi-
cators, which, it suggests, can combine to create a risk of more tradition-
al nation-state breakdown: food insecurity, job and income insecurity, 
human rights violations, incidents of ethnic or religious conflict, rising 
regional inequities, and excessive military spending.99 Importantly, the 
2010 HDR, citing twentieth century Hungarian economic philosopher 
Karl Polanyi, notes that the role of governments will be critical to pro-
moting human security and averting dangerous tipping points, as markets 
have generally been “very bad at ensuring the provision of public goods, 
such as security, stability, health and education.”100 
 Climate change will make it even more difficult for governments 
to provide a measure of basic human security to their people. As the 
2010 HDR notes: 
Climate change may be the single factor that makes the future very 
different, impeding the continuing progress in human development 
that history would lead us to expect. While international agreements 
have been difficult to achieve and policy responses have been gen-
erally slow, the broad consensus is clear: climate change is happen-
ing, and it can derail human development.101 
Whether or not climate change derails the train of human development 
will be a question for scientists and policymakers alike. As Geoffrey Da-
belko, Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environmental Change 
and Security Program, notes, “A very important and distinctive contribu-
tion of human security is that it securitizes (makes a priority of) what 
individuals themselves see as their paramount concerns, and so pluralizes 
the meaning of security and opens up space for alternative security prac-
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tices.”102 If we can find a way to look at predicted climate impacts 
through a security lens, we can create opportunities for building social 
and ecological adaptive capacity across and throughout climate-impacted 
communities. 
By promoting political rights and rule of law protections, human security 
provides a comprehensive lens through which to conceive of, implement, 
and evaluate climate policy. In many ways, human security may provide 
a better avenue than human rights laws for protecting human rights. This 
is particularly true for economic, social, and cultural rights, which have 
been systematically marginalized and under-enforced by governments 
and largely ignored by mainstream human rights organizations.103 Like 
climate change itself, economic, social, and cultural rights violations are 
often plagued by the dilemma of attributing responsibilities and deter-
mining remedies.104 Given the efficacy of human rights law thus far to 
provide for economic and social protections, relying on human rights 
protections in an era of global warming would be a mistake. 
VI. ADAPTING TO A WARMER WORLD REQUIRES PRIORITIZING HUMAN 
SECURITY AT INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND LOCAL SCALES 
 As already argued, heat stress is a significant threat to human 
security in a warmer world. To protect basic human needs in an era of 
global climate change, international climate adaptation policies must 
provide an overarching framework for decentralized human security pol-
icies that strengthen rule of law protections for the provision of basic 
human services. State and local governments should build capacity for 
protecting human security by providing access to food and water, ade-
quate health care and education, and equal access to courts. 
 The idea of making a warmer world safer by strengthening do-
mestic rule of law may not seem politically feasible. One reason is that 
thirst, hunger, conflict, inequity, and injustice pre-date significant climate 
warming. Already, these stresses overwhelm the international communi-
ty and undermine global stability. Also, climate change, by adding addi-
tional stresses such as heat, further compromises existing inequities and 
threatens global security, particularly in the developing world where rule 
of law protections are the weakest. However, adaptation policy crafted 
solely on what might be politically feasible rather than what might be 
necessary to avoid the devastating human impacts of a warmer world 
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will have significant implications for global human security. One conse-
quence is that the ecological and social consequences of climate change 
may threaten democracy itself.105 
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) might provide one response to such threat. The UNFCCC is 
an international climate treaty dedicated to protecting global society from 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”106 Yet, 
the UNFCCC does not explicitly protect human rights threatened by cli-
mate change. Although the international human rights discourse provides 
useful and important human rights standards and principles, actual hu-
man rights laws—particularly rights threatened by climate change such 
as the rights to food107 and health108—are traditionally not enforced. 
 Alternatively, a human security approach to rights-based protec-
tions from climate harms might have more potential to be actionable giv-
en the geopolitical importance of security and security-based considera-
tions. In addition, a focus on security may go farther than human rights 
protections to ensure the strength of the very institutions and democratic 
systems that are vital for overseeing and protecting human welfare and 
human rights. Below, we will address how laws and policies addressing 
human security concerns can be integrated into existing international 
frameworks for climate adaptation, and implemented at national and lo-
cal scales. 
A. International Climate Policy: The Human Rights Dilemma 
 Although climate change threatens justice all around the world, 
the plight of disappearing small-island states still anchors the debate on 
climate justice. The Malé Declaration is a major reason why. The Malé 
Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change109—an 
initiative of the Association of Small Island States—is primarily respon-
sible for elevating climate justice and the broader human rights impacts 
of climate change to the world stage. The Malé Declaration compelled 
the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) to conduct a detailed study into the effects of climate change 
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on the full enjoyment of human rights.110 The January 2009 OHCHR Re-
port helped promote the consideration of the human rights impacts of 
climate change to the vulnerable peoples of the world. However, “the 
work of making that justice a necessary element of our global climate 
response remains incomplete.”111 
 Indeed, protecting the human rights of climate-impacted peoples 
will require untested levels of international cooperation. Judging from 
recent international climate negotiations, the best means for achieving 
cooperation among over 190 countries remains unclear. The fifteenth 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC took 
place in December 2009 in Copenhagen, Denmark.112 The major goal 
was to create a legally binding set of mitigation targets to set the post-
Kyoto Protocol agenda. The parties to COP 15 did not achieve their goal. 
Instead, a small group of nations including the United States, Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China signed the non-binding Copenhagen Ac-
cord, of which the COP “took note” but did not formally adopt.113 Al-
though the process failed to produce any legally binding mitigation tar-
gets, “the result may be more an appraisal of the UNFCCC’s governance 
process, which requires consensus among its [194] member countries, 
than a commentary on the overall state of international climate poli-
cy.”114 The sixteenth meeting of the COP recently concluded in Cancun, 
Mexico.115 Although the parties to COP 16 had again reached a stalemate 
on any legally binding targets for curbing climate pollution, delegates 
successfully negotiated the Cancun Agreements—a package of separate 
agreements that reiterate key elements of the Copenhagen Accord. These 
agreements commit major economies to mitigation cuts, adaptation 
measures for vulnerable countries, and climate finance goals.116 
 The political nature of the Copenhagen and Cancun Agreements 
reveals that achieving consensus so far is only possible through the adop-
tion of extra-legal agreements. Thus, the fate of the Kyoto Protocol—a 
legally binding agreement set to expire in 2012—has been described as a 
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“political landmine.”117 Despite its limitations, the UNFCCC still appears 
to be the most appropriate existing international legal body for eventually 
setting global emissions targets. And while top-down global emissions 
mitigation policy is critical, it is not clear that the UNFCCC structure is 
best suited for crafting meaningful adaptation policies, which require a 
much less centralized and a much more place-based approach. “A more 
promising approach to moving forward would be to split the climate-
change problem up into different pieces and address the more tractable 
pieces in more specialized forums.”118 
 Yet, the UNFCCC still needs to play a coordinating role for 
adaptation. Without the UNFCCC, state governments will lack the con-
ceptual frameworks and the institutional capacity required for creating 
and funding meaningful adaptation programs in the short term. Long 
term, the UNFCCC must work more closely together with forces such as 
the United Nations OHCHR, U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, military officers, civilian 
commands, and local non-governmental organizations to oversee a new 
and robust legal and policy architecture that coordinates adaptation with 
efforts to secure human rights protections, development, and human se-
curity across the globe. Relegating international adaptation policy solely 
to the UNFCCC alone reflects the shortsighted and unhelpful perception 
that climate change is merely an environmental problem. 
 In the end, it remains to be seen to what extent the UNFCCC’s 
adaptation policies will ensure the basic protection of human rights. In 
this vacuum, a new conceptualization of adaptation must emerge. Adap-
tation driven by human security concerns might be an effective supple-
ment to both the UNFCCC and to international human rights law as a 
way to better match policy responses to the importance and scale of the 
climate crisis. 
B. The Money Gap 
 Outside human rights concerns, another issue tied closely with 
adaptation is finance. Ultimately, climate finance is an equity issue. Poor 
nations argue that rich nations are historically responsible for causing 
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climate change and thus should pay to clean up the damage.119 Wealthy 
nations have responded by pledging—in theory—to help finance poorer 
countries’ adaptation to climate change. What has emerged has been re-
ferred to as the “money gap,”120 or the gap between the amount of funds 
rich nations have pledged but have yet to commit. The money gap is a 
key issue in adaptation going forward. 
 At COP 15, signatories to the Copenhagen Accord pledged mo-
nies toward financing adaptation and mitigation in the developing world. 
The agreement proposes $30 billion of Fast Start Finance funds for the 
2010–2012 period, and $100 billion per year by 2020.121 Specifically, the 
agreement proposes “[n]ew multilateral funding for adaptation [that] will 
be delivered through effective and efficient fund arrangements, with a 
governance structure providing for equal representation of developed and 
developing countries.”122 As of October 27, 2010, it is estimated that de-
veloped countries have publicly pledged $28.34 billion of Fast Start Fi-
nancing.123 But the question is whether signatories will actually deliver 
on their pledges. There is no common reporting format, so pledges and 
deliveries are difficult to track.124 
 Another adaptation finance issue involves distribution mechan-
isms. At recent meetings in Copenhagen and Cancun, parties did not 
agree on a new mechanism for administering adaptation funding for 
pledges committed.125 However, several adaptation finance mechanisms 
are already available under the UNFCCC—notably the Kyoto Protocol 
Adaptation Fund, The World Bank Pilot Program on Climate Resilience, 
and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).126 But these mechanisms are 
controversial. Poor countries prefer that the funds flow through the Kyo-
to Protocol Adaptation Fund because they can access funding directly, 
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without a United Nations intermediary.127 Rich countries prefer the funds 
to flow through the World Bank.128 However, World Bank funds may 
force recipients of adaptation funds to take out loans, an unfair burden.129 
From a climate justice perspective, poorer countries should have equal 
power to direct which mechanisms are used to distribute adaptation 
finance. 
 The Declaration of the Climate Vulnerable Forum is one way in 
which poor countries have attempted to grasp the reigns of adaptation 
finance. The Declaration is an intentionally extra-legal and extra-political 
document that lives outside the UNFCCC framework, created by signato-
ry states that feel ignored by the current law and policy infrastructure.130 
Kiribati, the Maldives, Bangladesh, Ghana, Nepal, Kenya, Vietnam, and 
Barbados—among other “low-emitting countries that are acutely vulner-
able to climate change”131—signed the document, which preemptively 
declared that the UNFCCC’s COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen would fail 
to prioritize their needs. The Declaration, among other things, seeks ad-
ditional financing mechanisms to fund adaptation in developing coun-
tries. The Declaration “[c]all[s] upon developed countries to provide 
public money amounting to at least 1.5% of their gross domestic product, 
in addition to innovative sources of finance, annually by 2015 to assist 
developing countries make their transition to a climate resilient low-
carbon economy.”132 Some commentators, though, have casually dis-
missed these extralegal declarations as cries for aid.133 
 However, the Declaration also calls upon international climate 
policy to address human rights, health, and security concerns specifically 
for those forced to relocate or who are left stateless. Not all signatories to 
the Declaration are island nations. But the threat of relocation may be 
just as compelling to states in Africa, such as Ghana, where migration is 
already taking place due to poverty and inequity,134 much more common 
drivers of displacement than climate change alone.135 Such a demand for 
rights-based protections from climate and non-climate threats alike calls 
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for strengthened governments, institutions, and domestic rule of law—
not just more aid. For, “[w]ithout improved political and economic insti-
tutions to reduce poverty and marginality, environmental change will 
continue to be an important proximate factor in migration decisions.”136 
Those who might scoff at the Declaration because it threatens the global 
wealth balance are avoiding confronting the inequities ripe to adaptation. 
Stephen Castles, Research Professor of Sociology at the University of 
Sydney and Associate Director of the International Migration Institute at 
Oxford, puts it this way: 
Weak states are not a fact of nature, but a result of inequality based 
historically on colonialism and, today, on neo-liberal globalization. 
Decrying potential climate induced displacement as a threat to the 
security [or wealth] of developed countries misses the point . . . that 
climate-induced displacement is a result of the human insecurity 
imposed on the South in the current global order.137 
 The money gap is a thus a foreseeable consequence of many un-
resolved equity issues. First, wealthy nations—by throwing money at the 
problem—continue to avoid real efforts to mitigate impacts by being 
charitable. In an economy buried under global recession, it will inevita-
bly prove difficult for countries to deliver upon even the most well-
intentioned pledges. This is the case even though helping poor people in 
far-off places “adapt” to climate change seems—quite unfairly—to be 
preferable to reducing emissions at home. Second, depending on which 
mechanisms are used to distribute funding, the billions of dollars pledged 
for adaptation have tremendous potential to reinforce patterns of global 
inequity. It is quite problematic that no clear legal means for resolving 
disputes exist once monies begin to flow, and it is unclear who will arbi-
trate such issues as corruption charges, fights over entitlements, and 
claims of unfair distribution schemes. Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, how much will climate change alone factor into which impacts 
warrant resources from adaptation funds? In his New York Times blog 
Dot Earth, opinion reporter Andy Revkin frames the question this way: 
The issue is that all commitments under the language of the founda-
tion climate treaty, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
relate only to climate change driven by the buildup of greenhouse 
gases. Who arbitrates what portion of a sub-Saharan drought is from 
this background warming and which part is driven by patterns of ex-
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treme drying etched in African climate history? No one, of 
course.138 
 To the contrary, the answer is not “no one.” International human 
rights bodies, as well as world organizations that promote development 
and protect human security, should arbitrate. Debate over which human 
impacts are climate-caused and which ones are not should not be argued 
when an individual’s very survival—and global security for that mat-
ter—is at stake. Harms that are “[t]he result of sudden or gradual envi-
ronmental disruption that is consistent with climate change and to which 
humans more likely than not contributed”139 should be the basic standard 
for evaluating where adaptation monies flow. As such, only the absolute 
minimal level of causation is necessary and no more. Standards for de-
termining access to adaptation finance must be consistent with human 
rights laws and norms and with aims to protect human and global securi-
ty. 
C. Regionalized Harms Necessitate Regionalized Solutions 
 According to Chris Field, co-chair of the IPCC working group 
on impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, climate impacts are poorly 
known and understood.140 Thus, the IPCC is focusing more of its re-
search in this direction.141 In order to prioritize which impacts receive 
adaptation funding, the IPCC’s research on global climate impacts must 
then be downscaled and integrated into localized policies for response 
and action. Universities, the military, and civil society groups play a sig-
nificant role in this effort. 
 For example, Dr. Richard Anyah, Professor of Atmospheric 
Sciences at the University of Connecticut, is studying meteorology and 
atmospheric science in Kenya, focusing on developing regional climate 
change scenarios. He stresses the importance of regionalizing the prob-
lem of climate change and its solutions.142 Harms must be contextualized 
for impacts to translate and relate to impacted communities. In that vein, 
Dr. Ton Dietz, a Professor of Geography at the University of Amster-
dam, promotes “needlework policy,” calling for development and adapta-
tion plans sensitive to local conditions and perceptions of climate change 
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rather than a one-size-fits all approach.143 Needlework policy promotes 
bottom-up approaches to adaptation—strategies and responses that im-
pacted communities craft themselves. Bottom-up approaches are one of 
the key principles of human security, and thus should play a critical role 
in any sound adaptation policy agenda or in setting funding priorities.144 
“This decentralized approach will not be sufficient in itself to solve the 
climate-change problem. But it offers a useful supplement to the 
UNFCCC process and will be all the more important if the UNFCCC 
continues to be stalemated.”145 
 Thus, climate adaptation policies should be coordinated but not 
universal. They should be targeted to respond to particularized impacts 
on specific regions, places, and communities. They should be flexible 
enough to respond to improvements in science. And, perhaps most im-
portantly, they should invest in capacity building. Communities are al-
ready impacted by climate change and they are already adapting. Yet 
building capacity so that communities can more effectively respond to 
current risks is critical for adaptation. One UNDP working group identi-
fied capacity building as a key strategy for addressing climate change 
adaptation: 
[S]trengthening national and local capacities to manage climate-
related risks, as they can be understood now, is the best strategy to 
be able to manage more complex climate risk in the future. It is also 
more feasible to mobilize national and international political and fi-
nancial resources to manage an existing risk scenario than to ad-
dress a hypothetical future scenario. Medium and long-term adapta-
tion must begin today with efforts to improve current risk manage-
ment and adaptation. And lessons from current practices along with 
the notion that learning comes from doing are of critical impor-
tance.146 
 For example, right now, decision makers could work with local 
groups to take many productive steps, such as 1) suspend taxes147 or pro-
vide free seeds during droughts; 2) provide pest- and mold-proof insu-
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lated storage facilities for grains;148 3) change hunting seasons to coin-
cide with shifting seasonality patterns of caribou; and 4) initiate pro-
grams to train citizens from climate impacted communities in meteorolo-
gy or in the use of regional climate models.149 In addition, assuming that 
researchers continue to document an increase in violent crimes during 
excessively hot days, doctors and psychologists could work with law and 
policy makers to debate the formation of a new criminal defense for 
crimes committed under conditions of excessive heat. International mi-
gration policies could incorporate protections for the rights to work and 
job training, to leave and re-enter, to health (including mental health care 
and counseling), and to additional protections, such as social security, 
land title, citizenship status, and cultural values.150 Finally, local law and 
policy makers could prioritize adaptation strategies based on what securi-
ty means to their communities.151 Policymakers should then build local 
and institutional capacity to anticipate risks to that security and craft 
adequate local responses based on local knowledge and priorities. 
 The above list of localized law and policy changes is suggestive 
of the types of important immediate “climate” adaptation policies capa-
ble of protecting human rights and furthering human security in a war-
mer world. Strengthening the rule of law—the legitimacy and effective-
ness of laws, policies, and institutions such that 1) people understand and 
activate their rights, and 2) lawyers and judges actively enforce these 
rights—is essential to strengthening local adaptation capacity. Laws to 
suspend taxes during times of severe drought, mitigate criminal sen-
tences for prisoners who commit crimes linked to heat stress, and shift 
hunting seasons when seasonality disrupts migration patterns, may be 
perceived as insignificant and unrelated to climate adaptation. But once 
climate problems are dissected, one discovers that small, seemingly in-
significant solutions have considerable leverage for improving peoples’ 
lives. Politically decentralized actions that prioritize human security—
whether through ensuring access to clean drinking water or strengthening 
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public health systems—must be packaged in effective frameworks that 
define overarching goals and coordinate actions across multiple scales of 
government and society. Our climate justice framework is one example. 
(See Sec. II.) 
 The task of creating frameworks for adaptation that are culturally 
competent, localized, multidisciplinary at heart, and capable of support-
ing a “calculus-based” model of human security with all of its combina-
tions of permutations, makes mitigation seem easy. Adaptation is indeed 
much more complicated. Yet it offers many co-benefits, including the 
opportunity to securitize human rights and build a better future. As 
“adaptation is more than merely avoiding climate risks, and must ac-
commodate peoples’ rights and aspirations for the future.”152 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Our own heat hypothesis—that global security will be more im-
pacted by heat stress than by rafts of climate refugees relocating to es-
cape rising seas—is neither meant to undermine the plight of peoples 
who may eventually need to relocate due to rising sea levels nor to dis-
courage the remarkable efforts made to protect the rights of “climate 
change refugees” or the human rights of peoples fighting for survival on 
small-island states. 
 The attention on the climate refugee constituency, evidenced by 
countless media articles and recent legal scholarship drafting a separate 
refugee conventions for climate refugees153 is by no means undeserved. 
But law and policy makers should neither get complacent nor stop there. 
Instead, we argue that forced migration should be considered “a matter of 
last resort when other adaptation strategies have failed, rather than an 
automatic response to environmental degradation.”154 The emphasis on a 
more complex set of interactions—as framed by the ubiquitous impacts 
of heat that necessitate a human security narrative—has to a large extent 
been neglected. This is unacceptable. To protect human dignity in the 
face of creeping vulnerabilities, for which climate change is but one 
cause and migration is but one response, adaptation policies must both 
protect the “right to stay as well as the right to leave, allowing people to 
choose the response that best suits their needs and values.”155 As argued 
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earlier, adaptation policies must not favor one universal response, such as 
permanent migration.156 Instead: 
Responses need to be guided by considered, well-informed re-
search, not by sensationalism, assumptions or fear. To oversimplify 
the causes of movement, misuse terminology, and not listen to the 
voices of affected populations obscures the multiplicity of factors 
that need to be considered in any formal response. As some scholars 
have observed, it is essential to consider ‘the socio-cultural-
political-economic environment that communities exist in; the cog-
nitive processes of the people experiencing the impact of climate 
change; the individual, household, and community attitudes to mi-
gration and migration outcomes; and the type of climate stimulus 
that migration may be responding to.’157 
 With this article, we wish to make a compelling case that in ad-
dition to small island states, there are countless other global hot spots 
where migration is just one factor as climate change, human security, and 
economic security collide.158 Heat will exacerbate the existing conflicts 
prone in these areas, which requires adaptation policies tailored to a hu-
man security agenda. 
 One of these global hot spots is Australia. Australia is the 
world’s driest continent,159 deemed to become one “inevitable” home for 
climate refugees from the Pacific islands.160 In response, Australia has 
been pressured to open its borders to climate refugees.161 Ross Garnaut, 
former climate change adviser to the Australian government, has stated 
that “[t]he rest of the world expects that and, in the end, we’re likely to 
accommodate that, so there’s a solution there.”162 However, “[i]n the 
three-degree [warmer] world, far more of Australia will burn.”163 More 
bush fires may make Australia’s landscape less tolerable for displaced 
climate refugees attempting to make a new home there. Australia has a 
long history with bush fires, but as temperatures climb, bush fires will 
endanger more people as fire risk and intensity multiply with increasing 
drought and heat. These extreme conditions will cause a rise in the 
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spread of vector-borne disease (such as dengue fever), agricultural col-
lapse, rationed water, burned houses, and economic loss for the everyday 
person and for Australia as a whole,164 with no legal redress for damages. 
Climate refugees, if treated as second-class citizens, may be particularly 
vulnerable. Thus, the promise that Australia may provide a safe haven 
for climate refugees may be an empty one. Migration as a solution that 
solves all problems may not be as feasible as Australia, or the world, had 
hoped. Human security strategies may help better connect the dots. 
 Another example comes from Carteret Islands of Papua New 
Guinea. Although media coverage of the issue singled out the refugee 
crisis, as you will read below, relocation is not the whole story. Due to 
eroding shorelines, in 1984 the government of Papua New Guinea relo-
cated ten families from the Carteret Islands to the main island of Bou-
gainville, who later returned when fleeing from civil war.165 The persis-
tent, unanswered question seems to be where in a warmer world can you 
relocate coastal communities if there is persistent global instability? In 
2006, in response to a lack of government assistance with efforts to relo-
cate, the Carterets’ Council of Elders formed a nonprofit organization to 
assist most of the Carterets’ population of 3300 in voluntarily relocating 
to Bougainville.166 The media branded the peoples of the Carterets the 
world’s first climate refugees.167 However, the climate refugee label 
means nothing to Carteret Islander Ursula Rakova, who wrote: 
[T]he story you have not likely read is the one of government fail-
ure and the strategy we developed in response, so as to engineer our 
own exile from a drowning traditional homeland. Carterets’ people 
are facing, and will continue to face, many challenges as we relo-
cate from our ancestral grounds. However, our plan is one in which 
we remain as independent and self-sufficient as possible. We wish 
to maintain our cultural identity and live sustainably [sic] wherever 
we are. While we call on the Papua New Guinea government to de-
velop policy, we are not sitting by. Instead, we now want to see the 
media headlines translate into practical assistance for our relocation 
program. And we hope our carefully designed and community-led 
action plan can serve as a model for communities elsewhere that 
will be affected by climate change in the future.168 
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 In theory, linking human security to adaptation efforts is a first 
step to offering adequate adaptation responses that protect human rights, 
uphold human dignity, and achieve climate justice. Because, “[h]uman 
security evokes the faces of the world’s poor, in rural and urban areas, 
struggling to earn a living, the name itself places the individual and hu-
man well-being at center stage, revealing the insufficiency of a state-
based approach to security.”169 The exacerbation of poverty through cli-
mate change will further challenge the traditional, discrete models of se-
curity infrastructures, humanitarian aid efforts, and environmental poli-
cies. At the same time, these interconnections challenge us “to examine 
larger questions of human vulnerability, the dynamics of conflict and 
cooperation, and, ultimately, equity and justice.”170 
 If a human security framework delivers an innovative and cohe-
rent way of thinking about the human dimensions of climate impacts in 
our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, it may provide 
the most useful lens for crafting and critically evaluating climate adapta-
tion policy. 
 In this essay, we have advocated the strategy of addressing cli-
mate adaptation by applying a human security perspective. And although 
we focus explicitly on climate adaptation, we do not wish to diminish the 
importance of climate mitigation. In order to limit climate impacts on the 
world’s most vulnerable peoples, the human community must also work 
actively to de-carbonize the future by investing in critical renewable 
energy sources and infrastructure. One key area of overlap between our 
human security focus and many climate mitigation efforts is the idea of 
energy security—the focus of Admiral Mullen’s speech171 and one per-
mutation of complex variables important to Col. Beebe’s call for a “cal-
culus-based” security model.172 Although energy security is an important 
component of human security, it hides the full story. Human security, the 
broader lens we apply in this essay, more fully embodies the type of ho-
listic thinking that we argue is required to solve the complex problems of 
a warmer world. For it is our basic social, political, and economic institu-
tions—despite any faint pride that we may boast about our modest in-
vestments in renewable energy development—that will ultimately deter-
mine the extent of climate change’s impacts on humanity in a warmer 
world. 
 Additionally, the prospect of a thriving renewable energy land-
scape appears to be bleak. Although investment in renewable energy is 
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critical, we cannot yet rely on the benefits. Energy forecasts for the year 
2035 reveal the domination of oil despite the availability of alternative 
energy sources today.173 Thus, planning for the future demands planning 
for the worst-case scenario, a future where carbon dioxide remains large-
ly un-caged. The consequences of inaction are not difficult to imagine: 
picture an image of the sun throwing itself across a barren Arctic horizon 
while a camel rises on its haunches in the heat. People are hungry and 
thirsty and being forced to relocate from their homes. Governments 
crumble. Rights are systematically violated. Cultures disappear. All of 
these harms take place on a scale that we have never dared to imagine. 
Without regimes in place now to achieve drastic emissions reductions, 
more comprehensive adaptation planning will be critical to meet the 
needs of a desperate human population. Human security ought to be a 
major component of that planning process. 
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